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Peer Sexual Harassment: Existing Harassment 
Doctrine and its Application to School Children 
. * oAmyM Rubzn 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments . ... It is required in the performance of our 
most basic public responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship. Today, it is a principal instrument in awakening 
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment . ... [IJ t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education. Such an opportunity . .. is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms. I 
- Chief Justice Warren 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sexual harassment, the practice of making unwelcome sexual advances 
or requests for sexual favors, is like a disease spreading out of control. It 
can happen to anyone, male or female,2 and can invade any environment, 
ranging from the workplace/ to the housing market,4 to the military,5 to the 
classroom. 6 This epidemic attacks people of all ages, including children. 
* J.D., St. John's University School of Law; AB., University of Michigan; Associate 
at a firm in New York. 
1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954). 
2. This Article will focus primarily on harassment of females, since they are the most 
common victims. See infra notes 52-62,87-90 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 11-75 and accompanying text. 
4. See Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo Sexual Har-
assment, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 213,214 nn. 23 & 24. 
5. See, e.g., U.S. v. Foster, 40 M.J. 140 (1994); see a/so U.S. v. Robinson, 37 M.J. 588 
(1993); Major William T. Barto, Sexual Harassment and the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice: A Primer for the Military Justice Practitioner, ARMY LAW., July 1995, at 3. 
6. See infra notes 76-108 and accompanying text. 
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Our legal system7 has tried to alleviate the problem of sexual harassment, 
and its long-lasting injuries, through prevention strategies and liability 
schemes. For example, Congress and the courts have created an analytical 
construct to deal with sexual harassment in the workplace so that victims 
may have redress. 8 This construct has served as a model for recent efforts to 
attack the national problem of peer harassment in elementary and secondary 
schools. 9 Some schools have implemented sexual harassment policies and 
grievance procedures, as well as incorporating sexual harassment education 
into teacher training and student curricula. Moreover, Title IX of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 197210 has prompted suits against school districts 
and faculty for failing to take action when they are aware of peer sexual 
harassment. There is much confusion, however, about the proper approach 
to prevention of and liability for peer sexual harassment. 
Because several courts have modeled peer harassment analyses after the 
employment construct, this Article will begin with a discussion of estab-
lished legal defmitions and standards for sexual harassment in the work-
place. The article will then describe the serious problem of peer harassment 
in public schools, as well as existing prevention approaches and remedies. 
A brief discussion about the treatment of children under the law will follow. 
The conclusion will both recommend better ways to manage the problem of 
sexual harassment in public schools and suggest a scheme of liability. 
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LEGAL STANDARD 
Addressing peer sexual harassment is all the more difficult because 
traditionally courts have only dealt with sexual harassment in the workplace, 
as a form of employment discrimination. Prior to 1976, II even in the work-
place setting, courts treated harassing conduct as a personal matter that was 
neither related to employment nor based on sex. 12 The first type of sexual 
harassment to be addressed by our legal system was treated as a form of 
7. "Legal system" refers to federal, state, and local legislatures, courts, and agencies. 
8. See infra notes 11-75. 
9. "Peer harassment" means student-on-student harassment. 
to. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1994). 
11. See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Defini-
tions, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 41 (1990) ("Prior to 1976, sexual harassment simply 
happened to women. It did not have a name .... "); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court (1986), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED to3, 105 
(1987) ("The legal claim for sexual harassment marks the first time in history ... that 
women have defined women's injuries in a law."). 
12. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) 
(dismissing sexual harassment claim under Title vn because sexual advances deemed not 
to constitute sex discrimination). 
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employment discrimination. 13 The conduct had not even been labeled "sexual 
harassment. ,,14 Today, as a result of litigation since 1976, sexual harass-
ment commonly refers to offensive sexual conduct, and courts acknowledge 
that this conduct is a violation of the law. Catharine MacKinnon, a law pro-
fessor and women's studies scholar, has defmed sexual harassment as "the 
unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship 
of unequal power .... ,,15 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") 
agreed, in part, with MacKinnon's defmition, and in 1980 issued guidelines 
stating that sexual harassment is a violation of Title vn of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. 16 The EEOC's defmition describes harassment on the basis of 
sex to be "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." This conduct gives rise 
to an action under Title VII when: (l) submission to such conduct is made 
either explicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) 
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the 
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such con-
duct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individ-
ual 's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
working environment.17 
The Supreme Court recognized two types of actionable sexual harass-
ment in the work place under Title vn in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son. 18 The fIrst type of harassment, known as quid pro quo harassment, ex-
ists when submission to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature is an 
explicit term or condition of employment. It applies when a supervisor 
13. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding, for the first time by a 
federal court, that sexual harassment violates Title VII). 
14. Helena K. Dolan, The Fourth - R - Respect: Combatting Peer Sexual Harassment in 
the Public Schools, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 215, 224 n.94 (1994) (citing CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 52 (1979) ("Trivialization of 
sexual harassment has been a major means through which. its invisibility has been en-
forced."». 
15. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1-2 
(1979). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a)(1) (1989). Title VII precludes employment discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The inclusion of sex as a cate-
gory of discrimination was meant to cause the defeat of the statute in Congress. The Con-
gressman offering the amendment thought that by adding sex to the statute it would be 
considered absurd. The attempt failed, and the statute passed, but there is no legislative 
history to explain the meaning of discrimination based on sex. See 110 Congo Rec. 2577-
84 (1964). The EEOC is the administrative agency charged with enforcement of Title VII. 
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4 & -5. 
17. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(a) (1995). 
18. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (bank employee alleged con-
stant sexual harassment by supervisor). 
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conditions a tangible benefit on sexual favors and punishes the subordinate 
who does not COmply.19 The second, called hostile environment sexual har-
assment, occurs when supervisors and/or co-workers create an atmosphere 
that is "so infused with hostility toward members of one sex" that it alters 
the working environment.20 The trier of fact determines the severity of the 
situation by looking at the totality of the circumstances and the record as a 
whole. 21 The legality of conduct is decided on the facts on a case by case 
basis.22 
Rather than strictly apply the EEOC guidelines, the Supreme Court in 
Meritor attached three caveats to its decision and held that not all harassing 
conduct gives rise to an actionable claim. The first Meritor caveat requires 
sexual harassment to "be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the condi-
tions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment, '" to be a basis for a cause of action. 23 The dictionary definition of 
"severe" is marked by strictness or hard to endure,24 "pervasive" means 
spread through every part,25 and "alter" means to make different. 26 This 
standard echoes the approach used by the 5th Circuit in Rogers v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission,27 which requires that a plaintiff 
prove that the harassment is both pervasive and psychologically debilitating 
in a Title VII hostile environment case.28 Significantly, the EEOC rejected 
19. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). Quid pro quo 
harassment corresponds to (1) & (2) of the EEOC guidelines. 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(a). 
20. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding 
that female participant in medical school residency program had made prima facie case of 
hostile environment); see also Mentor, 477 U.S. at 57. Hostile environment harassment 
corresponds to (3) of the EEOC guidelines. 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(a). 
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11 (b); Men'tor, 477 U.S. at 69. 
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b). 
23. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 
1982) (following Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971)). The Court concluded 
that the allegations were sufficient to state a claim under Title VII. Respondent claimed 
she had been subjected to constant sexual harassment by her supervisor for four years. 
The supervisor made repeated demands for sexual favors during and after business hours. 
Respondent estimated she had intercourse with him 40 or 50 times. Additionally, 
"respondent testified that [the supervisor] fondled her in front of other employees, fol-
lowed her into the women's restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, 
and even forcibly raped her on several occasions." Id. at 60. 
24. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 633 (7th ed. 1974). 
25. Id. at 520. 
26. Id. at 38. 
27. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court has been criticized for using the 
Rogers approach rather than the EEOC guidelines. See Pollack, supra note 11, at 59 
(comparing the guidelines with the "more formidable Rogers approach"). 
28. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 ("I do not wish to be interpreted as holding that an em-
ployer's mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in 
an employee falls within the proscription of[Title VII]. But ... I am simply not willing to 
hold that a discriminatory atmosphere could under no set of circumstances ever constitute 
an unlawful employment practice. One can readily envision working environments so 
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psycho-
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this requirement in its 1980 guidelines, which protect employees from both 
single and pervasive incidents of sexual harassment by placing an affIrma-
tive duty on employers to stop workplace sexual harassment. 29 Moreover, 
the EEOC guidelines used a more lenient threshold of "unreasonably inter-
fering", which means exceeding the bounds of moderation30 in the act of af-
fecting one another. 31 Although the Court purported to be using the EEOC 
guidelines as a basis for its opinion, it rejected the guideline language in fa-
vor of the much harsher standard. 32 Therefore, the Court's terminology 
forces women to tolerate a higher level of abuse than does the language of 
the EEOC.33 
The second Meritor caveat requires that the sexual advances must have 
been "unwe1come.,,34 The fact that the claimant was not forced to partici-
pate in the sexual conduct against her will-indeed even if the claimant's 
participation was 'voluntary'-is not a defense to a suit.35 To determine 
unwe1comeness, the Court requires scrutiny of the claimant's conduct. This 
standard has been criticized for its ambiguity. 36 The Court itself noted the 
difficulty of applying the standard in stating that "the question whether par-
ticular conduct was indeed unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof 
and turns largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact . 
. . . ,,37 This standard has also been criticized for turning the focus on the 
victim's behavior, much like the consent standard in a rape analysis, rather 
than that of the miscreant's.38 For example, the fact that the claimant's 
logical stability of minority group workers, and I think Section 703 of Title VII was aimed 
at the eradication of such noxious practices."); see Christine O. Merriman & Cora G. 
Yang, Employer Liability of Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N. Y. U. 
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 93 (1985) ("A single incident of discrimination is insufficient 
grounds upon which to bring a cause of action under Title VII."). 
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11; see Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see 
also Merriman & Yang, supra note 28, at 94-95. 
30. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 754 (7th ed. 1974). 
31. Id.at373. 
32. See Mentor, 477 V.S. at 65-66. 
33. Cf Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (Finally, in 1993, a unani-
mous Supreme Court rejected the need for proof of psychological injury when an environ-
ment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive). 
34. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 ("The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the 
alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.") (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). 
35. Id. at 69. 
36. There is much confusion about the distinction between unwelcome conduct and vol-
untariness. See. e.g., Pollack, supra note 11, at 55-59. Pollack calls the Court's distinc-
tion between voluntary and unwelcome "dangerous language, ripe for misinterpretation." 
It suggests that a woman may voluntarily participate in her own harassment which, in ef-
fect, blames the victim. This approach makes the unwelcome standard harder to satisfy 
because it only looks at the woman's conduct and "judges by a pseudo-neutral perspec-
tive." Additionally, Pollack questions how a court that finds harassment which is suffi-
ciently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of employment can find that the victim 
voluntarily participated. Id. at 58. 
37. Mentor, 477 V.S. at 68. 
38. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 827 (1991). This standard 
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sexually provocative speech or dress is relevant to the unwelcomeness 
analysis has been severely criticized.39 
Finally, the Court in Meritor addressed employer liability and rejected 
the contention that in hostile environment cases40 there is automatic liability 
when supervisors harass employees.41 In addition, the court found that the 
absence of notice to the employer will not always protect him or her from 
liability.42 The Court refused to issue a definitive rule for employer liability, 
but suggested that lower courts look to agency principles for guidance. This 
vague explanation leaves the issue open for interpretation and circuits re-
main split on the issue ofliability.43 Critics have denounced this part of the 
presents at least three serious problems. First, the focus is on the victim, generally a 
woman, not the alleged wrongdoer. No burden is placed on the man to refrain from mak-
ing advances until the woman, who is generally in a less powerful position, clearly rejects 
the advances. Second, this standard directs the court to examine the woman's conduct to 
determine whether her rejection was clearly expressed. A verbal rejection is not enough 
for the court to find "unwelcomeness." Third, the courts may look to a woman's dress. 
This factor effectively denies a woman the right to dress as she chooses since an outfit may 
be used to prove that she invited the harassment. By forcing the victim to prove that her 
conduct did not welcome the advances, the Meritor Court presumed the woman is to blame 
for being victimized. Id. at 826-29; see also Pollack, supra note 12, at 55-59. 
39. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69. In response to the Court of Appeals' statement that testi-
mony regarding respondent's "dress and personal fantasies ... had no place in this litiga-
tion," the Supreme Court said "[w]hile 'voluntariness' in the sense of consent is not a de-
fense to such a claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech 
or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular 
sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant." Id. at 
68-69 (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1985)}. See also 
Estrich, supra note 38, at 827. 
40. Employers are strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment. See Henson v. 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (lIth Cir. 1982) ("Because the supervisor is acting within at 
least the apparent scope of the authority entrusted to him by the employer when he makes 
employment decisions, his conduct can fairly be imputed to the source of his authority."). 
41. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73. This variation from liability for quid pro quo harass-
ment has been explained: "The capacity of any person to create a hostile or offensive envi-
ronment is not necessarily enhanced or diminished by any degree of authority which the 
employer confers upon that individual." A supervisor creating a hostile environment acts 
outside the scope of authority granted him by the employer. Henson, 682 F.2d at 910. 
42. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
43. Several commentators and a majority of Federal Circuit courts have interpreted the 
Court's language to mean that a formal policy and complaint procedure will shield the 
employer from liability for either supervisor or co - worker sexual harassment. See, e.g., 
Bouton v. BMW of North America, 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[A]n effective 
grievance procedure-one that is known to the victim and that timely stops the harassment-
shields the employer from Title VII liability for a hostile environment" because "there is 
no negligence if the procedure is effective," and "[a] policy known to potential victims also 
eradicates apparent authority the harasser might otherwise possess."); see also Estrich, su-
pra note 38, at 826 ("Those in the majority implicitly suggested that in hostile environ-
ment cases no employer, or at least none with a policy against harassment should be found 
liable in the absence of actual or constructive knowledge."). But see Karibian v. Columbia 
University, 14 F.3d 773, 779-780 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding employers strictly liable for 
hostile environment sexual harassment committed by a supervisor using "actual or appar-
ent authority to further the harassment, or if he was otherwise aided in accomplishing the 
Winter 1997] PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT 147 
decision, asserting that it makes it more difficult to prove liability than in 
any other type of Title VII action.44 
B. A MEASUREMENT OF JUDICIAL SUCCESS 
Thus, the federal cause of action for sexual harassment is an invention 
of our times. The prohibiting legislation did not come into existence until 
1964 with the passage of Title VII. 45 Over ten years passed before the stat-
ute was applied to sexual harassment46 and the Supreme Court fIrst affIrmed 
such application in the 1980s.47 For conduct that had no name just a few 
years ago, sexual harassment is now a substantial social concern. The past 
two decades have seen it become a popular and political issue with incidents 
such as the Clarence Thomas confIrmation hearings,48 the resignation of 
Senator Bob Packwood,49 and the alleged misconduct of President Clinton.5o 
Despite the increased awareness51 and developing jurisprudence, the 
problem of sexual harassment in the workplace remains pervasive and 
costly. A 1981 study of the federal workplace showed 42% of the approxi-
mately 10,650 women who responded had been sexually harassed in the two 
harassment by the existence of the agency relationship," regardless of notice and proce-
dures. For coworkers: "the employer will not be liable unless 'the employer either pro-
vided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about 
it. '''). 
44. Courts hold employers strictly liability for any other type of discrimination under 
Title VII. See, e.g., Miller, 600 F.2d at 213 (announcing that respondeat superior applies 
in Title VII cases). See Estrich, supra note 38, at 853-54 and n.158 ("Where a supervisor 
discriminates in wages, hours, or working conditions, the employer must remedy that dis-
crimination whether or not the employer knew about it, should have known about it, or 
approved it. "). 
45. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
46. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1976). This early recognition 
only included quid pro quo sexual harassment. 
47. Mentor, 477 U.S. at 57. 
48. Anita Hill charged that Clarence Thomas sexually harassed her when she worked as 
his legal assistant at the Education department and the EEOC. She alleged that he asked 
her out and described pornographic movies, as well as his own sexual fantasies to her. 
See, e.g., Anita Hill Isn't Sorry About Harassment Claim; It Almost Cost Clarence Tho-
mas a Seat on High Court, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 7, 1992, at A6. 
49. Oregon's Senator Bob Packwood was forced to resign in the face of alleged sexual 
harassment of coworkers and employees for many years. See, e.g., Donna St. George & 
Jodi Edna, Focus on the Packwood Diaries a Life Laid Bare, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 
10, 1995, at A12 (revealing excerpts of diaries show sexual activity at work for over two 
decades). 
50. Paula Jones alleged that Mr. Clinton harassed her during a state-sponsored event in 
a Little Rock hotel when he was the Governor of Arkansas and she was a state employee. 
See, e.g., Neil A Lewis, Court Denies Bid to Delay Clinton Sex-Harassment Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. to, 1996, at At. 
51. For example, companies are taking notice of their responsibilities, as evidenced by a 
1994 Society for Human Resource Management poll that showed 75% of 292 companies 
had implemented some kind of sexual harassment prevention. Deborah Duenes & 
Francine Herme1in, Sexual Harassment Inc., WORKING WOMAN, Oct. 1, 1994, at 9. 
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years prior to the survey. 52 The estimated cost to the government for sexual 
harassment from 1978 to 1980 was $189 million. 53 A follow-up study in 
1988 revealed a similarly high rate of harassment,54 but the cost over a two 
year period increased to $267 million. 55 A 1995 survey by the Washington 
Post of 8,000 federal workers found that 44% of women and 19% of men 
had been the subject of "uninvited, unwanted, sexual attention, ,,56 suggesting 
that there has not been a significant change in workplace behavior. Between 
1992 and 1993, total awards from charges filed with the EEOC doubled, 
reaching $25.2 million. 57 According to a 1988 poll in which 160 Fortune 
500 companies responded, 90% had received complaints for sexual harass-
ment and one third had been sued.58 It costs the average Fortune 500 com-
pany $6.7 million a year in lost productivity from sexual harassment suits. 59 
A New York lawyer said that her corporate clients who go to trial each 
spend $100,000 in legal fees alone.60 Law fIrms also report high rates of 
harassment according to recent surveys. For example, a 1989 survey of 900 
female associates and partners surveyed in the country's top law fIrms re-
vealed that 60% had been sexually harassed. 61 The foregoing studies are 
just a sample of the high incidence and costs of sexual harassment in various 
fields, and the numbers are steadily increasing according to the EEOC. In 
1990, the agency received 5,694 sexual harassment complaints, whereas 
1995 brought nearly 16,000 complaints.62 
Statistical data are not necessarily an accurate reflection of the magni-
tude of the problem because sexual harassment is largely unreported. 63 Vic-
52. Baker, supra note 4, at 215 (citing U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: Is IT A PROBLEM? 33-35, A-4 (1981 ». 
53. Estrich, supra note 38, at 821. 
54. Baker, supra note 4, at 213. 
55. Estrich, supra note 38, at 822. 
56. Bill McAllister, Harassment Case Took 5 Years to Resolve; Many Say Lengthy Pro-
ceedings Show Difficulty of Proving Charges in Federal Bureaucracy, WASHINGTON POST, 
Mar. 13, 1996, A19 (citing survey by Merit Sys. Protection Bd.). 
57. Duenes & Herrnelin, supra note 51, at 9. 
58. Baker, supra note 4, at n.16 (citing Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the For-
tune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988, at 69.) 
59. Pamela 1. White & Susan R. Matluck, Conduct Unbecoming a Lawyer-Expanding 
Tort Remedies for Sexual Harassment, (available in WL at 24-SUM Brief 16, n.12 (1995» 
(citing Sandroff, supra note 58, at 69). 
60. Duenes & Herrnelin, supra note 51, at 9 (quoting Bettina Plevan, attorney with 
Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn). 
61. White & Matluck, supra note 59, at 16 (citing a survey conducted by The National 
Law JournallWest Publishing). 
62. Baker, supra note 4, at 213 (citing Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, 1 Emp. Dis-
crimination § 41A.12 n.12 (1993»; Suzanne Wolfe, If You Ire Sexually Harassed. (Legally 
Speaking), RN, Feb. I, 1996, at 61. Ninety percent of the claims filed with the EEOC are 
by women. Elaine Herskowitz, a senior attorney with the EEOC's Office of Legal Coun-
sel, explains this: "Sexual harassment is typically perpetrated by people who have power 
over their victims. And men are more often in a position of power." Id. 
63. See Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment (Survey Results), WORKING WOMAN, June I, 
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tims fear the embarrassment and degradation of making a complaint,64 as 
well as reprisal. 65 These fears are not unfounded, as illustrated by the expe-
rience of a woman who reported to her supervisors that she was sexually 
harassed by coworkers. Instead of correcting the situation, some supervisors 
participated in the harassment, while another responded that these things 
"happened in a man's working world every day in the week" so that she 
should not be oversensitive.66 Many women believe that filing a complaint is 
"career suicide.".67 A female sprinkler fitter claims "sometimes 1 think 'I 
won't take this for one more day.' And then 1 think, 'They will not force me 
to leave this career, this security, this pay. I'm here to stay. ",68 
The damage to victims of sexual harassment covers a broad range of 
problems including the perpetuation of a hierarchical employment structure 
where women are not always viewed as equal to men. Additional ill effects 
include discharge, being forced to quit, and other damage to career. 69 Psy-
chological and physical effects such as anxiety, loss of self-confidence, nau-
sea, headaches, high blood pressure, and ulcers are also common. 70 
Finally courts are trying to address sexual harassment,71 but the Meritor 
construct is in need of improvement for the legal system to effectively handle 
the problem.72 Although recent legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 73 which allows the award of capped compensatory and punitive dam-
1992, at 47 (reporting results ofa reader survey with over 9000 participants). "More than 
60% of our readers said they personally have been harassed .... However, since only one 
out of four women reported the harassment and most companies receive fewer than five 
complaints a month, it's obvious that the vast majority of women who are harassed don't 
feel they can safely report a problem." Id. See also Elizabeth Janice, I'm Not Going to 
Take it Anymore; Fighting Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Feb. 
1, 1996, at 65 ("[ A]bout 90% of cases are never reported, estimates William Petrocelli, co-
author of Sexual Harassment on the Job: What It Is and How to Stop It. "). 
64. See Merriman & Yang, supra note 28, at 99 (explaining silence of victims makes it 
difficult to prove notice to employer of sexual harassment). 
65. Id. See also Sandroff, Sexual Harassment (Survery Results), supra note 63, at 47 
("'I cannot say absolutely that 1 would file charges, because 1 need that job! And that fact 
makes me really, really angry .... Many [of our] readers ... insist that filing a complaint 
still amounts to 'career suicide. "'). 
66. Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co., 461 F. Supp. 894,936 (D.N.J. 1978). 
67. See Sandroff, supra note 63, at 47. 
68. Pollack, supra note 11, at 84. 
69. Sandroff, supra note 63, at 47. 
70. See Merriman & Yang, supra note 28, at 83 n.6. 
71. Many commentators believe the progress is caused by an increase in society's 
awareness, and refer to this period as "post-Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill." See Janine De 
Fao, What is Sex Harassment? Schools Struggle to Learn, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 8, 
1994, at AI; see also Shari Finnell, Harassing Behavior Ingrained, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, 
June 3, 1994, at COl; Kristina Sauerwein, A New Lesson in Schools: Sexual Harassment 
is Unacceptable, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at E 1 [hereinafter Sauerwein, A New Lesson] 
(stating that heightened public awareness has caused a flood of inquiries and lawsuits). 
72. See supra notes 18-44 and accompanying text. 
73. 42 U.S.C. §1981a(a)(l) (1994). 
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ages to victims of intentional harassment,74 has advanced plaintiffs' rights, 
more change is necessary. Most women responding to a 1992 survey be-
lieved that the government must make changes such as ease (78%) and speed 
up (800/0) the complaint resolution process, lengthen state statutes of limita-
tions for reporting harassment (60%), and increase penalties for companies 
(66%).75 
III. PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
A. THE EXISTING SITUATION AND RESULTING HARMS 
Where women see greater recourse in the courts for workplace harass-
ment, school-age girls face entirely unchartered territory in challenging peer 
sexual harassment. 76 The increase in lawsuits and inquiries about peer har-
assment are an indication of the gravity of the problem. For example, the 
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York reports an explosion 
of cases in the past three years. Additionally, the founders of Parents for 
Title IX, an education-advocacy group dealing with sexual harassment in 
schools, receive dozens of calls every month about peer harassment. This is 
a dramatic increase since the group's commencement in 1992.77 Children 
are living through nightmares every day they go to school by being forced to 
endure fellow students' lewd comments and gestures, as well as being 
grabbed, rubbed up against, and fondled. 
Rise S. Cramer knew shoes. The scuff on a sandal. The hole in a 
sneaker. The crusted mud on a boot. 
The 13-year-old knew people by their shoes because her head hung 
low. Her eyes would greet feet. 
74. 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(l), (2), & (3) (amount of compensatory and punitive damages 
varies with size of employer); see Pollack, supra note 11, at 51; White & Matluck, supra 
note 59, at 16. 
75. Sandroff, Sexual Harassment (Survey Results), supra note 63, at 47. 
76. This paper will only examine public elementary and secondary schools, although 
there is also sexual harassment in private institutions and higher education. See, e.g., 
Baker, supra note 4, at 213 and nn. 20-21. 
77. Sauerwein, A New Lesson, supra note 71, at El (quoting Jeanette Lim, an attorney 
and director of policy and programs for the Federal Office for Civil Rights). See Kristina 
Sauerwein, Districts Get Word: Control Sex Behavior, ST. loUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 
26, 1995, at AI. The Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights spokesperson 
called sexual harassment in elementary and secondary schools "a growth industry": 143 
student complaints in the 1992-93 academic year as compared with only 15 in 1987-88. 
"[A] good number" of these complaints were about peer harassment, although precise 
numbers are not available. Sauerwein, A New Lesson, supra note 71, at E 1; see infra notes 
79-113 and accompanying text. Peer sexual harassment has been defined as student-to-
student "[b ]ehavior so severe, pervasive and persistent that it creates a hostile environment 
for the student [victim] ... usually of a sexual nature." 
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Feet proved friendlier than the faces she met on the school bus, rid-
ing 10 miles ... to Kearney Intermediate School. 
These were the laughing faces of six or so boys about her age ... 
who, she said, laughed when they called her a bitch and a whore. 
Who, she said, laughed when they told her she enjoyed having sex 
with dogs. Who, she said, laughed when they masturbated, clothed, 
in front of her. 78 
151 
In a 1993 nationwide survey of children in seventy-nine public schools, 
the American Association of University Women Educational Foundation 
(hereinafter "AAUW") found that four out of five eighth to eleventh graders 
experienced sexual harassment at public school. 79 Of the 1,632 students in-
terviewed, 85% of girls and 76% of boys reported unwanted sexual ad-
vances that interfered in their lives.80 Seventy-nine percent of those students 
were victimized by other students. 81 A 1995 survey of over 300 high school 
students in Missouri showed that about one in three students have observed 
or experienced sexual harassment, mostly student-to-student. 82 Comments 
written by the students included: "I'm female. It's like that's an open invi-
tation to give me trouble .... I don't let it get to me. It happens all the time. 
[Sex discrimination] has made me untrusting, cautious and a little 
cynical. ... It's a huge problem that needs to be addressed.,,83 Young stu-
dents are not immune to sexual harassment in school; the AAUW reported in 
another study that one third of children harassed by peers were in grade six 
or earlier. 84 In Minnesota alone, the Attorney General found more than 
2,200 peer sexual harassment incidents were reported to elementary school 
administrators during the 1993-94 school year. 85 As a result of their sur-
veys, the AAUW concluded that "we now know that sexual harassment in 
the classrooms and hallways of America's schools is a major problelIr-{)ne 
we can no longer afford to ignore. Unchecked, it will continue to deny mil-
78. Kristina Sauerwein, Sex Harassment Makes School Hellish For Girl, ST. loUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 26, 1995, at lA (describing sexual harassment endured by a teen 
whose case is expected to go to trial next year). 
79. Gail Sorenson, Peer Sexual Harassment: Remedies and Guidelines Under Federal 
Law, 92 EDUC. LAW REp. 1, 1 (1994) (citing AMERICAN AsS'N OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN 
EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN 
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 11 (1993)). 
80. Dolan, supra note 14, at 219 (citing HOSTILE HALLWAYS). 
81. Sorenson, supra note 79, at 1. 
82. Kristina Sauerwein, Survey of Students: Sexual Harassment an Issue for Many, ST. 
Lours POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 15, 1996, at A2. 
83. Id. 
84. Susan J. Berkson, Sex Harassment is the Enemy, Not This Curriculum, STAR 
TRIBUNE (MINN.), Dec. 8, 1994, at A27. 
85. Id. We can only speculate about how many incidents went unreported. Victims are 
often unsure of what they have experienced or too afraid to tell anyone. See Kate Beem, 
Parents are Just Looking For All The Right Answers, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 26, 1994, at 1. 
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lions of children the educational environment they need to grow into healthy, 
educated adults. ,,86 
Females are the most frequent targets, and males are most often the per-
petrators of peer sexual harassment. 87 "Although young men can also be 
victims of sexual harassment, it occurs less frequently, is usually less severe 
in form and seems to have less impact on [them].,,88 The AAUW studyes-
timated 85% of girls and 76% of boys reported harassment, but the discrep-
ancy between genders increased when frequency of harassment was consid-
ered.89 While 66% of females and 49% of males claimed occasional 
harassment, 31 % of females as opposed to just 18% of males reported being 
harassed often.90 
As the following accounts illustrate, much of the harassment includes 
remarks, gestures, touching, and staring. Two eighth-grade sisters in 
Houston stopped taking the bus to school because it became unbearable and 
dangerous. 91 Several boys called them derogatory names for months, and on 
one occasion, a boy forced his hand up one sister's skirt and blouse.92 A 
middle school boy regularly swatted and grabbed a female classmate on the 
school bus, in addition to making comments such as, "When are you going 
to let me fuck yoU?,,93 A California teenager endured harassment that in-
cluded a fellow student saying, "You look so good I could rape you. ,,94 A 
ten-year old student was fearful as she watched six boys throw two of her 
girlfriends onto the ground, stuff grass into their mouths to prevent screams, 
make lewd comments, and try to strip them.95 A woman in New York re-
calls a boy who cornered her in a classroom, put his hand in her blouse, and 
grabbed her breasts when she was 12 years 01d.96 A student explained her 
86. Sorenson, supra note 79, at 2 (quoting HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 79, at 7). 
87. See Carrie N. Baker, Proposed Guidelines on Sex-Based Harassment of Students, 43 
EMORY L.J. 271, 278 (1994) (citing two national studies that show female students are 
harassed more than male students and suffer greater consequences than males); see also 
Dolan, supra note 14, at 221-22. Therefore, this paper will only report experiences of fe-
male students. 
88. John M. Leighty, When Teasing Goes Over the Line, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 8, 1992, at 
12 (citation omitted). 
89. See Dolan, supra note 14, at 221-22. 
90. Id. 
91. A. Phillips Brooks, School Districts Grapple with Sexual Harassment Issue, 
HOUSTON CHRON., July 16, 1995, at 5. 
92. Id. An investigation by the U.S. Office of Civil Rights showed that girls riding on 
that bus were called obscene names on a daily basis, including "whore," "trick," and 
"slut." Id. 
93. Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District, 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996). 
94. DeFao, supra note 71, at AI. The teacher responded to the student's complaint by 
moving the harasser's seat to where he could make comments to other females in the class. 
Id. 
95. Sauerwein, A New Lesson, supra note 71, at E 1. 
96. Debra M. Katz, School Districts Formulating Policies on Sexual Harassment, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, section LI at 1. 
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fear when she was dragged into the boys' locker room: "It was a joke at fIrst 
and I was laughing, and then I didn't think it was a joke anymore and I got 
really scared.,,97 
Students have made sexual harassment a permanent and regular part of 
the school day and have even coined terms and phrases for the activities. In 
one Illinois school district the boys have created a grab-the-girls-in-the-
private-parts-week.98 A Montana school is home to flip-up Friday when the 
boys lift girls' skirts for sport.99 Students also participate in "spiking," 
which describes two people pulling another student's pants down,100 and 
"sharking," which refers to biting body parts, such as breasts. 101 
The consequences of sexual harassment for its victims, like this 
fourteen-year old New Hampshire girl, are tragic: 
I've been sexually harassed for almost 3 years now, and it really 
hurts me, and it makes me feel like I'm a bad person, or that I'm no 
good and deserve what I get. One guy kept trying to feel me up and 
go down my pants in class. He'd also rub his leg up and down my 
leg and I hated it. He'd also ask me to have sex with him .... I 
really felt low and he called me a slut and a bitch when I said "NO." 
It shouldn't be happening to anyone, it breaks your soul and brings 
you down mentally and physically. 102 
Another such victim is Rise Cramer, who still sees the laughing faces of 
the boys who harassed her. She saw them in her mind when she took a 
shard of glass and sliced it into her face. She saw them in her mind as she 
entered a psychiatric hospital because she "was tired of being alive."I03 
Even after Mrs. Cramer pulled Rise and her brother out of the school dis-
trict, she did not escape the torture. Rise said the incident "follows me . . . . 
I am the girl who boys did gross things to."I04 Another victim describes the 
harassment as so humiliating that she and her sister became depressed and 
withdrawn. Their grades plummeted as well as their self-esteem. 105 After 
97. Greeta Anand, Students Dissect Sexual Harassment, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 16, 1994, 
at 1 (describing a video featuring student accounts of sexual harassment in school). 




101. Rob Hotakainen, Schools Quizzed on Sexual Harassment / 1.110 Incidents and 95 
Violent Acts Last Year, ~INNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., Apr. 30, 1993, at B 1. 
102. Sorenson, supra note 79, at 1 (quoting NAN STEIN, SECRETS IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS 3a (1993». 
103. Sauerwein, Sex Harassment Makes School Hellish/or Girl, supra note 78, at lA. 
104. Id. As her reputation follows her so does the harassment. She was told by a boy 
who sucked on a hot dog that she should give him and his friend oral sex. Id. 
105. Brooks, supra note 91, at 5 (discussing a peer sexual harassment case that may be 
heard by the 5th Circuit this year) ("One boy put his hands up my daughter's skirt and 
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nine-year-old Jennifer Reichert received a sexually explicit note, she "felt 
humiliated, confused, and sick to her stomach." After two of the note's 
authors threatened to kill her, Jennifer's parents pulled her out of school, 
fearing for her safety.l06 
Some resulting emotional responses experienced by victims are self-
doubt, fear, shame, anger, helplessness, confusion, and degradation. lo7 
Physical consequences include insomnia, listlessness, and depression. 108 
Children are forced to change classes, stop riding the bus route, change 
schools, and go through their education as innocent victims, enduring psy-
chological and physical torture. The AAUW reported that victims do not 
want to go to school, do not want to talk in class as often, and cut classes or 
school to avoid the harassment. 109 When sexual harassment in school is al-
lowed to continue by those in charge it makes the victims feel betrayed by 
peers and school staff, causing distrust and diminished interest in school. 110 
"If sexual harassment is allowed to occur it disrupts the right to equal edu-
cation by interfering with the student's psychological, social, and physical 
well-being, plus learning, attendance, course choices, grades, and therefore, 
economic potential. ,,111 Some scholars and school administrators believe 
that ignoring this conduct sends a message of inequality to girls and of 
privilege to boys,l12 a lesson that will remain with students through adult-
hood. l13 
As with workplace harassment, the frrst step in correcting peer sexual 
harassment is to recognize the harm and move toward effective prevention 
and remediation. 1l4 A major obstacle to taking this step is the lack of ap-
propriate responses to the problem of peer sexual harassment by school 
blouse, and another touched her genital area. My children suffered tremendously."}. 
106. Jack Cheevers, Schools Get Low Marks on Sexual Harassment, SEATTLE TIMES, July 
9, 1995, at A8. 
107. See Berkson, supra note 84, at A27; see also Monica L. Sherer, No Longer Just 
Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IX For Peer Sexual Harassment 141 U. PA. L. 
REv. 2119, 2131-34 (1993) (analyzing the difference in emotional responses evoked by 
harassment and flirting). 
108. Sherer, supra note 107, at 2134. 
109. See Kirsten M. Eriksson, What Our Children are Really Learning in School: Using 
Title IX to Combat Peer Sexual Harassment, 83 GEO. L.J. 1799, 1801 n.17 (1995). 
110. See Sherer, supra note 107, at 2134. 
111. Id. (quoting Susan Strauss, Sexual Harassment in School: Legal Implications for 
Principals, NAT'L ASS'N SECONDARY SCH. PRINCIPALS BULL., Mar. 1988, at 93.) 
112. See Jane Gross, Schools are Newest Arenas for Sex-Harassment Issues, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 11, 1992, at B8; see also Eriksson, supra note 109, at 1808 ("When schools fail to 
respond appropriately to peer sexual harassment, they not only permit specific instances of 
harassment to continue, but also promote the practice of sexual harassment, because the 
perpetrator and others receive an implicit seal of approval from the school administra-
tion."). 
113. See Dolan, supra note 14, at 216 ("Sexual harassment at the student-to-student level 
directly impacts the emotional and behavioral development of children, and sets the stage 
for how they will treat each other as adults."). 
114. See Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
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faculty and administration. llS A conunon attitude is "boys will be boys,,,ll6 
and the conduct is construed as harmless exploration and joking. School of-
ficials have also expressed the view that the girls "asked for it."ll7 An ele-
mentary school vice principal, hearing about a sexually explicit note written 
to a female student, told the devastated victim to "respect" the boy and "give 
[him] his space.,,1l8 The situation got worse for the victim after making the 
complaint. School districts must recognize peer harassment as a serious 
problem in order to be effective in finding its cure. 
B. EXISTING REMEDIES 
1. State and Local Level 
State governments and school districts have made some progress in al-
leviating the peer harassment problem. Many school districts have imple-
mented sexual harassment policies and procedures, many of which include 
sanctions from warnings to expulsion.1l9 In 1993, California passed a law 
requiring school districts to have a policy defming sexual harassment and 
disciplinary measures to deal with violative behavior. l20 Minnesota has had 
this type of law in effect since 1989. 121 Advocates of harassment policies 
are glad to increase sensitivity to inappropriate and offensive behavior 
through publication of and discussion about harassment policies. 122 One 
school district with a sexual harassment policy and procedure reported that 
there was no rash of complaints about everyday teenage behavior, as had 
been predicted. 123 In addition to the existence of a policy and procedure, 
115. See Beem, supra note 85, at 1 ("Often the incidents go unchecked until they escalate 
into something more, like violence .... "). 
116. In response to Jane Doe's father complaining about the sexual harassment of his 
daughter, the guidance counselor said essentially "boys will be boys." Doe v. Petaluma 
City School District, 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1565 (N.D. Cal. 1993). When Tawyna Brawdy 
and her mother appealed to a teacher to stop the peer harassment Tawnya was enduring, 
the teacher responded, "That's just too bad. You'll just have to live with it." See Spaid, 
supra note 98, at 3. 
117. See Eriksson, supra note 109, at 1800 (citing NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. 
FUND AND THE WELLESLEY COLLEGE CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, SECRETS IN PUBLIC: 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS 4 (1993) (reporting a young woman's story: "Once I 
told a guidance counselor, but was made to feel like a whore when she asked questions 
like 'Do you like it?' and 'They must be doing it for a reason. What did you do to make 
them do it?"'). 
118. Cheevers, supra note 106, at A8. 
119. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 96, at 1 (discussing policies enacted by Valley Stream 
Central High, South Huntington, Jericho, and Sewanhaka school districts, and proposed 
policies in Lawrence, Syosset, and Hewlett-Woodmere school districts); see also Hotaka-
inen, supra note 101, at Bl (punishments for harassment in Minnesota schools include ex-
pUlsion, transfer to other schools, writing essays, apology, counseling and detention). 
120. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 212.6 (West 1993). 
121. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127.46 (West Supp. 1993). 
122. See Katz, supra note 96, at I. 
123. Id. 
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many people believe that education and sensitivity must be part of a policy's 
implementation. "This must be a part of their daily lives, their attitude in 
every class .... You can punish the action, but you don't end up changing 
the attitude that caused it.,,124 Critics disagree with trying to control stu-
dents' social conduct, and caution that the law limits the extent to which a 
school may discipline a student. 125 They are concerned about punishing stu-
dents for crossing the not-always-clear-cut line that separates harmless 
flirting or joking from sexual harassment. 126 
Districts have also educated school staff and students about what har-
assment is and how to handle it. 127 In Minnesota, private consultants and the 
state have been providing secondary school teachers with harassment train-
ing for years. 128 More recently, the Minnesota Department of Education re-
ceived a federal grant for the development of a harassment prevention cur-
riculum for elementary schools. 129 Minnesota is the only state to require 
discussion of sexual harassment in the classroom, but California legislation 
does allow school officials to suspend or expel students in grades four 
through twelve for peer harassment. 130 Additionally, schools have developed 
reporting procedures, surveyed students about harassment in the schools, 
and hired experts to conduct sexual harassment workshops for teachers and 
students. 131 
2. Federal Level-Title IX 
Under federal law, sexual harassment is prohibited under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 which was designed to eliminate discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs. 132 The 
statute provides, in part: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis 
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiv-
124. DeFao, supra note 71, at AI. 
125. See Brooks, supra note 91, at 5; see also Katz, supra note 96, at 1 ("High school is a 
place where students typically joke with each other .... [Y]ou don't want to stifle kids' 
social lives. You don't want kids having to think before they speak."). 
126. See Brooks, supra note 91, at 5. 
127. The AAUW has workshop materials for teachers and students which covers what 
sexual harassment is and how to address it. Participants review language and conduct 
viewed as sexual harassment, and students are reminded of the difference between degra-
dation caused by harassment and positive feelings caused by flirting. Dolan, supra note 
14, at n.262 (citing Judy Mann, What's Harassment? Ask a Girl, WASH. POST, June 23, 
1993, at D26). 
128. See Berkson, supra note 84, at A27 (This began as early as 1988.). 
129. Id. 
130. CAL EDUC. CODE § 48900.2 (West 1995). 
131. Sherer, supra note 107, at 2135-39. 
132. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 106.11 (1996); see Bennett v. West 
Texas State University, 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding Title IX applicable 
only to programs receiving direct federal assistance). 
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ing Federal fmancial assistance .... ,,133 The Department of Education Of-
fice for Civil Rights (hereinafter "OCR") is the agency in charge of enforc-
ing Title IX.134 Its regulations prohibit sex-based harassment under the 
statute. 135 
In 1979, the Supreme Court upheld an implied private right of action 
under Title IX in Cannon v. University of Chicago. 136 The Court based its 
holding on the purposes of Title IX which it interpreted as avoiding the use 
of federal funds to support discriminatory practices and providing individu-
als with effective protection against such practices. 137 Later, in North Ha-
ven Board of Education v. Bell,138 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its view of 
Title IX and held that courts should accord the statute "a sweep as broad as 
its language.,,139 
Several courts have since attempted to address the problem of sexual 
harassment in schools by drawing an analogy between Titles IX and VII, 
and using established Title VII standards for analysis. 14O The Supreme 
Court first held that a claimant could obtain money damages from a school 
district for intentional sex discrimination141 under Title IX in Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Public Schools,142 a case in which school officials failed to 
take remedial or preventative action, despite their awareness that a teacher 
was sexually harassing a student. 143 In Franklin, the Court stated that a 
teacher's sexual harassment of a student, like a supervisor's harassment of 
133. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). 
134. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1996). A plaintiff may file a complaint with the Department of 
Education Office for Civil Rights for administrative remedy. The complainant may peti-
tion to be an amicus curiae at any administrative hearing regarding the complaint. Even 
without a complainant, the Department may investigate violations and impose sanctions, 
including withdrawal of federal funding. 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7-.8. 
135. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a) (1996). 
136. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
137. Id. at 704. 
138. 456 U.S. 512 (1982). 
139. Id.at521. 
140. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Dist. 1988); 
see also Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1570-77. 
141. Although Franklin did not expressly limit its holding to intentional discrimination, 
lower courts have interpreted the rule that way. See Joseph Beckham, Liability for Sexual 
Harassment Involving Students Under Federal Civil Rights Law, 99 ED. LAW REp. 689, 
690 (1995). When a school employee is the harasser, the school district's intent is estab-
lished under the agency principle of respondeat superior. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Public Schools,141 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992); see also Beckham, supra, at 690. The case did 
not give any further guidance as to what constitutes intentional discrimination. 
142. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
143. The plaintiff alleged that a teacher asked her sexually-oriented questions, forcibly 
kissed her on the mouth, asked her out, and removed her from classes in order to subject 
her to coercive intercourse. When teachers and administrators were told of the harassment 
of plaintiff and other female students, they took no action to stop it and discouraged plain-
tiff from pressing charges. The teacher resigned on the condition that all matters pending 
against him be dropped. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63-64. 
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an employee under Title VII,I44 is enjoinable sex discrimination and that a 
school district has an unquestionable duty to prevent sex discrimination un-
der Title IX.I45 Prior to Franklin, claimants could only seek withdrawal of 
federal funds from the institution or other equitable relief. I46 However, the 
Court in Franklin noted that monetary damages are necessary to provide an 
adequate remedy for a student because backpay is inapplicable, and pro-
scriptive relief offers no redress when the plaintiff and/or the accused are no 
longer at school. I47 
In Doe v. Petaluma City School District,I48 a federal district court ex-
tended the analogy of Title VII to Title IX to apply to peer sexual harass-
ment. This court was the ftrst to rule that students harassed by other stu-
dents are entitled to damages from school districts under Title IX. 149 In 
Petaluma, the basis of the plaintiff s claim was one of hostile environment 
sexual harassment; 150 the plaintiff argued that a student is denied the beneftts 
of or is subjected to discrimination in an education program on the basis of 
sex when he/she is driven to quit the program as a result of the harass-
ment. I51 The Petaluma court noted that the Franklin case resembled a hos-
tile environment case, because there was no indication that the teacher who 
engaged in the harassment conditioned a beneftt or detriment on plaintiffs 
response. I52 It found, in agreement with Franklin, that there must be proof 
of intentional sex discrimination by the school district for liability to be im-
posed.I53 However, the district's failure to take appropriate action in re-
144. The Court cited Meritor, a leading case on employment discrimination. See supra 
text accompanying notes 17-44. 
145. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75. 
146. OCR has never cut off funds to schools that discriminate, despite its power to do so. 
Tamar Lewin, A Touchy Issue: Schools Run Scared as Sex Suits Increase, COURlER-
JOURNAL loUISVILLE, KY, June 28, 1995, at 01A. 
147. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75-76. 
148. 830 F. Supp. at 1571-77. 
149. Id. at 1576; accord Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (1Ith Cir. 
1996) (holding that plaintiff established prima facie claim under Title IX for sexual dis-
crimination due to the Board's failure to take action to remedy a sexually hostile environ-
ment, despite knowledge of its existence). Cf Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School 
District, 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Title IX does not impose liability 
on school districts, absent allegations that the district itself directly discriminated on the 
basis of sex). "Thus, a school district might violate Title IX if it treated sexual harassment 
of boys more seriously than sexual harassment of girls, or even if it turned a blind eye to-
ward sexual harassment of girls while addressing assaults that harmed boys." Id. 
150. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1575. The court noted the leading Ninth Circuit case, 
Ellison v. Brady, and its definition of a hostile environment where, " an employee can 
show (1) that he or she was subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, (2) that this conduct was unwelcome, 
and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim's employment and create an abusive environment." Id. at 1572. 
151. Id. at 1575; see 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). 
152. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1575. 
153. Id. at 1576; cf Garza v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp 1437 (S.D. Tex. 
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sponse to complaints about peer sexual harassment, as alleged by the plain-
tiff, was held insufficient to prove intent to discriminate. l54 Failure to act, 
said the court, could be circumstantial evidence of the intent, and a plaintiff 
may claim that the inaction in the face of complaints was a result of the dis-
trict's actual intent to discriminate against the student on the basis of sex. 
The court further stated that liability under Title VII, which holds an em-
ployer liable when he/she "knew or should have known" about the hostile 
environment sexual harassment, is inappropriate. The court said that the 
'''knew or should have known' standard is in essence a negligence standard," 
and actual intent is required. 155 
In 1995, a federal district court fmally defmed intentional sex discrimi-
nation by a school district in Bosley v. Kearney R-J School District. 156 
Plaintiffs in that case claimed a Title IX violation against the school district 
for failing to act appropriately in the face of complaints about a hostile envi-
ronment created by peer sexual harassment. 157 The court explained that 
"discriminatory intent is a fluid concept that is sometimes subtle and diffi-
cult to apply.,,158 It does not mean the same thing as discriminatory motive, 
nor does it require that unlawful discrimination be the sole purpose behind 
defendant's actions. 159 Instead, discriminatory intent is an objective eviden-
tiary showing of defendant's total action and inaction,16O which "'implies 
that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of ac-
1994). In Garza, the plaintiff claimed her daughter was subjected to sexual harassment 
and assault by a peer, and that the defendants, school district and individual administra-
tors, knew but failed to take appropriate action. The court rejected the right of a student to 
bring a hostile environment action under Title IX but noted, that even in Doe v. Petaluma 
where the suit was allowed, proof of intent to discriminate was required. Id. at 1. 
154. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1576. The district court interpreted Franklin as holding 
that respondeat superior liability exists so that an institution is deemed to have intention-
ally discriminated when one of its employees harasses a student. It noted that agency 
principles are inapplicable to the relationship of a school district to a student. Therefore, 
respondeat superior cannot apply to peer sexual harassment. Id. at 1575-76. The court did 
not expand on what would be sufficient proof of intent to discriminate. 
155. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1576 (explaining that "knew or should have known" is 
like negligence which means "an employer who knows or reasonably should have known 
of a hostile environment is liable even if it attempts in good faith to eliminate the hostile 
environment ifit is found that the employer's efforts were not reasonably calculated to end 
the hostile environment."). 
156. 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995). Franklin implicitly relies on agency princi-
pals to impute intent because it did not deal with peer harassment, and Petaluma did not 
explain what would be sufficient proof for intentional (actual) harassment. 
157. Id. The court modeled its analysis on Title VII's "knew or should have known" 
standard and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment because of a genuine issue 
of fact as to whether defendant failed to act appropriately once on notice of sexual harass-
ment. Id. at 1025. 
158. Id. at 1020 (citing Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Fla., 698 F.2d 1181, 1185 (lIth Cir. 
1983) (holding court's finding of discriminatory intent not clearly erroneous where there 
was a disparity of municipal services among black and white areas». 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
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tion at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects 
upon an identifiable groUp.,,161 Therefore, a plaintiff must show through di-
rect evidence or by inference that defendant school district chose its response 
to complaints of peer sexual harassment at least in part because of plaintiff s 
sex. 162 
Underlying intent to discriminate is notice of a duty to prevent or stop 
wrongful conduct under Title IX. The Bosley court found notice to school 
districts from several sources including: Title IX which was enacted in 1972; 
the 1981 OCR defmition of sexual harassment and subsequent compliance 
reviews and complaint investigations; OCR Letters of Findings in 1989, 
which found a school in violation of Title IX for failing to take adequate 
steps to stop peer harassment and creating a hostile environment; 1989 Title 
IX regulations requiring schools to appoint a coordinator and have grievance 
procedures; and the Franklin case in 1992 which put districts on notice of 
potential monetary liability under Title IX. 163 The court thus found a re-
cently established duty to protect students from sexual harassment which 
could dramatically change the legal burdens in proving peer harassment by 
simplifying proof of intentional discrimination. 
As for potential defendants other than school districts, the court in 
Petaluma held that individuals do not have liability under Title IX.I64 How-
ever, on appeal the Ninth Circuit forecasted a change in individuals' liability 
for failure to act on reported peer sexual harassment. In reversing the dis-
trict court's denial of a school counselor's qualified immunity, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the counselor had a legal 
duty to take action against the peer harassment. 165 In order to deny a public 
official qualified immunity for acting in his/her official capacity, his/her 
duty must have been clearly established at the time of the inaction, which in 
161. /d. at 1021 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296 
(1979)). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 1025. It seems as if the Petaluma court's dicta was correct. See supra notes 
148-50 and accompanying text. It will be interesting to see what higher courts do with this 
decision. 
164. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1576-77 (dismissing claim because individuals have not 
been held liable under Title IX by other courts, are not subject to administrative enforce-
ment, are not mentioned in related statutes, and are not liable under Title VII); see Davis 
v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 862 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Ga. 1994) (dismissing Title IX 
claims against individuals because only federally funded institutions may be liable), rev'd 
on other grounds, 74 F.3d 1186 (lIth Cir. 1996); see also Garza v. Galena Park Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (dismissing claims against individuals un-
der Ti tle IX). 
165. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994). To overcome 
a claim of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must allege a violation of clearly established 
law. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Therefore, it was Doe's burden to 
show that the defendant failed to protect her from peer harassment when his duty was 
clearly established. Petaluma, 54 F.3d at 1449. At the time of defendant's inaction, there 
was no clearly established duty to act. Id. at 1450. 
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this case was from 1990 to 1992. 166 Since Franklin had not been decided at 
the time of the inaction, the Ninth Circuit concluded that there had not been 
a clearly established duty to prevent peer harassment. The court noted, 
however, that "if [defendant] engaged in the same conduct today, he might 
not be entitled to qualified immunity. ,,167 In dicta, the court explained that a 
Title VII analogy, using a "knew or should have known" standard, might be 
appropriate for individual faculty liability under Title IX for future cases in 
which the inaction occurred after the Franklin decision. 168 This could 
change liability for both individuals and districts if courts fmd school offi-
cials breached a clearly established duty to prevent peer sexual harassment. 
One month after the Ninth Circuit opinion, the Federal District Court of 
Connecticut expanded the class of potential defendants by holding, in Men-
none v. Gordon, that individual school officials could be held liable under 
Title IX for failure to protect students from reported sexual harassment. 169 
However, the court rejected the analogy to Title VII that other courts had 
employed. 170 Rather, the court relied on the plain language of the statute171 
and corresponding regulations l72 to conclude that there is no restriction on 
the nature or identity of a defendant (i.e. individual, institution, etc.) if he, 
she, or it exercises a sufficient level of control over the federally funded edu-
cational program or activity.I73 The statute does not on its face refer to in-
dividuals or institutions; it refers to programs or activities receiving federal 
funds. 174 The regulations clarify the class of potential defendants by defm-
ing "recipient" as "any . . . institution, or organization, or other entity, or 
any person, to whom federal fmancial assistance is extended directly or 
166. Petaluma, 54 F.3d at 1449. 
167. Id. at 1452. 
168. Id. 
169. 889 F. Supp. 53 (D.Conn. 1995). However, defendant's motion to dismiss was 
granted on the basis of qualified immunity. Id. at 69 (holding that inaction did not violate 
a clearly established constitutional or statutory right). 
170. Id. at 57 ("Although both statutes attack the same type of problems, they are struc-
tured so differently that Title vn is not an appropriate reference for determining the proper 
defendants in a Title IX action."). 
171. The plain language of the statute broadly refers to "discrimination under any educa-
tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) 
(1994). See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917) (using plain 
meaning to interpret Mann Act: "Where the language is plain and admits of no more than 
one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid 
doubtful meanings need no discussion."). 
172. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1-.2 (1996). Although an administrative agency's interpretation of 
a statute is not conclusive, it is entitled to deference if the interpretation is consistent with 
the language of the statute. Mennone, 889 F. Supp. at 59-60 (citing Young v. Community 
Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986». 
173. Mennone, 889 F. Supp. at 59. The court dismissed contrary conclusions by other 
courts. Id. (stating "[c]areful review reveals that the Sixth Circuit did not even address 
this issue .... [D]oe offers a thoughtful analysis of the statute, but we believe the court's 
reliance on analogy to Title VII ... is inappropriate."). 
174. 20 U.S.C. § l681(a) (1994). 
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through another recipient and which operates an education program or ac-
tivity which receives or benefits from such assistance .... ,,175 All that is 
required of a Title IX defendant is a degree of control over a federally 
funded education program or activity.176 The regulations also support the 
inclusion of individuals by stating that Title IX is "meant to eliminate ... 
discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance, whether or not such program or activ-
ity is offered or sponsored by an educational institution . ... ,,177 Whether 
courts of appeals adopt this rationale to broaden the group of potential de-
fendants for Title IX litigation remains an open issue. 
IV. TREATMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER THE LAW 
That children need to be protected from peer sexual harassment is ap-
parent as based on the foregoing analysis, but the legal system must pay at-
tention to the special nature of the victims when formulating standards. 
Given the extremely harmful effects known to result, the state has a compel-
ling duty not to tolerate sexual harassment in public schools. A lawyer with 
Advocates for Children and Youth in Baltimore, Maryland correctly stated 
the need for action against peer sexual harassment: "[S]chool has become a 
place where things that used to happen outside are now happening inside, 
things that we never imagined, and we have to become prepared to deal with 
that .... I think that we have to address [these things]. ... Not addressing 
them does not stop them from happening.,,178 
The framework of liability for adult sexual harassment does not work 
for children, who have traditionally received specialized attention under the 
law. It is well established that "[t]he state's authority over children's activi-
ties is broader than over like actions of adults .... ,,179 Minors' lack of ma-
turity, competence, and experience require parents and the state to control 
much of their lives. 18o 
Case law is replete with decisions based on the need to protect children 
more than adults. 181 There are also state and federal statutory schemes de-
175. 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1996) (emphasis added). 
176. Mennone, 889 F. Supp. at 56. 
177. 34 C.F.R § 106.1 (1996) (emphasis added). 
178. Jean Thompson, City Schools Lack Policy on Students' Sex Offenses, BALTIMORE 
SUN, May 9, 1995, at B 1 (referring to the need for clearer harassment guidelines). 
179. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
180. See supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text. 
181. See, e.g., Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1976) ("[S]tates validly may limit the 
freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative 
choices with potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been grounded in the 
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often 
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could 
be detrimental to them."); see also D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Techni-
cal Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1380 (3d Cir. 1992) ("The majority of secondary school students 
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signed to offer special protections for children. For example, sexual activity 
with a minor is a criminal offense under state statutes. 182 On the civil side, 
children lack capacity to enter into binding contracts, and a minor may dis-
affIrm any such contract. I83 The underlying theory is that minors need to be 
protected from their own inexperience and from adults who may take advan-
tage of them. This policy is strong enough to overcome the contract-law 
policy of protecting the other party's expectation when he/she deals fairly 
and in good faith. A child is also prohibited from disposing of property by 
will; virtually all states require a testator to be at least eighteen years old. I84 
This rule as well protects children from themselves and others. Various 
statutes prohibit the use of children for sexual stimulation or commercial 
gain. The Supreme Court has upheld such laws based on the compelling 
interest that states have in protecting the physical and psychological well 
being of children. 185 Similar interests were used to support child labor laws 
such as the Fair Labor Standards Act,I86 prohibiting "oppressive child la-
bor" practices, which include employment of children under the minimum 
legal age for particular types of employment. 187 Children are also protected 
by statutes of limitations. They are generally given extra time in which to 
bring claims, usually until the age of majority. 188 The need to protect chil-
are minors, and the law recognizes that their judgment may not be fully mature and devel-
oped: children cannot vote, U.S. Const. amend. XXVI; they cannot serve in the armed 
forces, 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (1988); if arrested, they are tried in juvenile courts ... ; and if 
pregnant, they must ask a parent for permission to have an abortion .... "). "It is well es-
tablished that children are generally incapable of providing for their own basic needs, and 
the law recognizes that their ability to exercise mature judgment often is not fully devel-
oped." Dolan, supra note 14, at 235 (citing Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 
F.2d 470,480 (5th Cir. 1982) and D.R., 972 F.2d at 1380). "Children are inherently de-
pendent on adults to guard them against the dangers of the world." Id. at 239-40. 
182. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1996) (making it unlawful to have sexual in-
tercourse with a minor who is not the perpetrator's spouse); see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14:80 (West 1995) (making "Carnal knowledge ofa Juvenile" unlawful). 
183. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:1-103 (1995) ("The age of majority as it pertains to 
the capacity to contract is eighteen years of age."); see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 
1-103 (1995) ("The age of majority as it pertains to the capacity to contract is eighteen 
years of age."). Disaffirm means "[t]o repudiate; to revoke a consent once given .... " 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 462 (6th ed. 1990). 
184. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-1.1 (McKinney 1981). 
185. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); see also Osborne v. Ohio 495 U.S. 
103 (1990). State courts have upheld this policy as well. See, e.g., People v. Geever, 522 
N.E.2d 200 (1988). 
186. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et. seq. (1989); see also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 
U.S. 490 (1945). 
187. "Oppressive child labor means a condition of employment under which (1) any em-
ployee under the age of sixteen years is employed by an employer ... in any occupation, or 
(2) any employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is employed by an em-
ployer in any occupation which the Chief of the Children's Bureau in the Department of 
Labor shall find and by order declare to be particularly hazardous for the employment of 
children between such ages or detrimental to their health or well-being .... " 29 U.S.C. § 
203( 1 )(1) (1989). 
188. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. § 208 (McKinney 1995). 
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dren supercedes an important policy by leaving the defendant open to poten-
tialliability for many years.189 
Following the above examples, our legal system must protect children 
from peer sexual harassment with a doctrine tailored to meet the special 
needs of minors. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The most important place and time to begin to abolish sexual harass-
ment is in elementary and secondary schools before the proscribed conduct 
occurs.l90 By sensitizing children at a young age, school districts can pre-
vent the attitudes that cause people to become both harassers and victims. 191 
Tolerance of sexual harassment sends a message that society believes girls 
are less worthy than boys and may be treated accordingly. One of the most 
fundamental problems is ignorance about sexual harassment. 192 Most stu-
dents are not aware of what it is or that their conduct would be classified as 
harassment. 193 Victims as well, are often unsure of what they have experi-
enced. 194 Strongly enforced legislation should require every school district to 
have a clear and detailed sexual harassment policy and procedure. 195 Al-
189. Protecting defendants from stale claims brought after a reasonable time has elapsed 
is the primary purpose of enacting statutes of limitations. See David Siegel, NEW YORK 
PRACTICE 37 (2d ed. 1991) ("The statutes embody an important policy of giving repose to 
human affairs.") (quoting Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 248 N.E.2d 871, 872 
(1969)). 
190. See Spaid, supra note 98, at 3 (quoting the mother of an eighth grade harassment 
victim who received a $20,000 settlement from school district: "You could get a million 
dollars, but there's nothing that can pay you back for what's been taken from you."). 
191. Just as some schools have diversity training as part of the curriculum to teach toler-
ance of people of other races, ethnicities, religions, etc., there should be gender education. 
See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105 para. 27-20.4 (Smith-Hurd 1995). 
192. E.g., Irene Sege, Sexual Harassment 101, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 1993, at 65 
(explaining that the 15-year-old boy suspended for verbal sexual harassment did not know 
how to approach the girl or know the line between friendly and offensive). It should be 
noted that for "harassment" to exist, the conduct must meet a minimum threshhold of of-
fense based on factors such as the age and intent of the perpetrator as well as the nature of 
the conduct. The recent incident involving six and seven year olds punished for kissing 
their classmates are better illustrations of the confusion among school officials than of peer 
harassment. See John Leland et aI., A Kiss Isn't Just a Kiss, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1996, at 
71. 
193. See Finnell, supra note 71, at COl ("The boys were sort of stumped when the issue 
of sexual harassment came up. They said no one had ever told them they couldn't act like 
this - their behavior had been accepted throughout grade school and middle schooL"). 
194. See id. ("During that tortuous school year, the thought of sexual harassment never 
entered my mind. Not once did I think of complaining to the teacher, the principal or my 
parents about the offensive behavior. In my mind, it was to be tolerated. I just had the 
misfortune of ending up in the wrong seat because of my last name. ") (victim remembering 
the lewd comments and pinches of a male classmate in seventh grade). 
195. Perhaps the best way to implement this proposal is by state law as in Minnesota and 
California. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127.46 (West 1995); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 
212.6 (West 1995). 
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though many districts have policies, they often leave out important informa-
tion such as who should be contacted with complaints and how to appeal 
school-district decisions to federal authorities. 196 Sections to incorporate 
into a peer harassment policy include: statement of policy and purpose; 
defmition and examples of sexual harassment; reporting procedure, includ-
ing notification of specified authorities, and importance of prompt and accu-
rate reports; investigation of complaints, including confidentiality, investi-
gation process, and discovery rules; resolution of complaint, including 
sanctions for perpetrators and students who make false accusations. 197 
Where rules are clear and strict, students will be better protected from sex-
ual harassment and its devastating consequences. 198 In addition, teachers 
should discuss sexual harassment in the classroom. Nan Stein, director for 
Wellesley College Center for Research on Women, advises schools against 
marginalizing the discussion to an assembly, disciplining in the principal's 
office, or teaching a senior class on the subject. l99 Schools should fully in-
form students about what is expected of them and what the ramifications are 
for misconduct. Students should also have a clear understanding of what 
they can do as victims. Information is the key. If people learn proper con-
duct in school, there will be less incidence of peer harassment and less need 
to reform adult behavior.2°O 
A grievance procedure must include a well publicized avenue for com-
plaints. Title IX requires the appointment of a coordinator to handle sexual 
harassment complaints, but not all school districts have complied and not all 
are effective.201 Often executives with various other tasks and little or no 
experience in dealing with harassment are chosen.202 "They don't really 
have knowledge of all the laws; they just have this extra title," reported 
Alicia Hetman, who has reviewed school compliance with anti-harassment 
laws for California's Department of Education. 203 The person or persons 
who receivers] complaints must be well-known and well-trusted to facilitate 
196. Cheevers, supra note 106, at A8 (citing Alicia Hetman from California's Depart-
ment of Education). 
197. Cf Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Selected Materials on Sexual Harassment, CA30 ALI-
ABA 591 (1995) (fonnulating sample sexual harassment policy for the workplace). 
198. In Atlanta, Georgia, Fulton County School District punished 123 students in 1994, 
Gwinnett County punished 136 students, including suspension of a high school student for 
coercing another student to perfonn sex acts behind the school, and Cobb County found 
146 students in violation of sexual harassment policies. Sherrel Evans, Schools Get Tough 
on Sexual Harassment, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Dec. 17, 1995, at G8. 
199. Peer Harassment: Ridding Your School District of the Title IX Troubles, 25 YOUR 
SCHOOL AND THE LAW 9 (Sept. 1995). 
200. See Finnell, supra note 71, at COl ("Considering the lessons so many of us missed 
out on in grade school and high school, it's no wonder so many men and women look stu-
pefied when charges of sexual harassment enter the workplace."). 
201. See Cheevers, supra note 106, at A8. 
202. See id. 
203. Id. 
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student reporting of sexual harassment, whether witnessed or experienced. 
One possible method of selecting such person[ s] is to allow the students to 
vote for faculty members who are interested. More than one appointee is 
beneficial, especially if there is at least one male and one female to hear the 
often embarrassing complaints. 
Districts should also provide information and training about peer sexual 
harassment to administrators and all school district staff because they are 
responsible for educating and protecting, as well as punishing students. 
Teachers and school officials need to be able to recognize peer harassment204 
and handle it when it exists. For example, school officials should take im-
mediate and appropriate action to stop any harassment, use progressive dis-
cipline, and never punish the victim (i.e. relocate victim to another class-
room). 205 Additionally, strict confidentiality may be appropriate to allow a 
perpetrator to learn from his mistakes without jeopardizing his future. 
Even with education, however, there will be sexual harassment in 
schools, and an internal grievance procedure may not be sufficient. Because 
of its serious nature and resulting harms, peer sexual harassment must be 
punished through an effective legal framework that targets those entities and 
individuals responsible. Both school districts and faculty that condone this 
behavior by ignoring complaints and cries for help should be held liable pur-
suant to Title IX. The District Court of Connecticut took the right approach 
in ]o.fennone206 for determining who may be liable under the statute. Courts 
need not look further than the plain language of the statute and regulations to 
see that individuals and institutions with control over federally funded edu-
cation activities and programs may be held liable. 207 This is contrary to the 
rule under Title vn where individuals are not liable for sexual harassment 
because employer liability is deemed a cost of doing business. Because 
public education is different from private employment, there is no reason to 
create the same ambiguous legal standard under Title IX. Schools should 
share liability with the employees who allow the perpetuation of sexual har-
assment of students. Children rely on teachers and administrators for guid-
ance and protection, necessitating that those with authority be held person-
ally liable for violations of Title IX. 
204. See Peer Harassment: Ridding Your School District of Title IX Troubles, supra 
note 199, at 10 ("A common mistake school officials make when presented with sexual 
harassment allegations is not being able to recognize what is and is not sexual harass-
ment," said an attorney whose law firm represents 265 schools and community colleges in 
California). Nan Stein also cautions administrators not to "go nuts if you hear one bad 
word." Behavior must be repeated, severe, or pervasive to constitute hostile environment 
sexual harassment. Id. at 9. 
205. Id. at 10 (as recommended by counsel for National Women's Law Center). An ap-
propriate response will vary from case to case. Id. 
206. Mennone, 889 F. Supp. at 56. 
207. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text. Higher level courts have not spoken 
on Mennone's theory of individual liability. 
¥ A , 
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Now that the duty to protect students from peer harassment has been 
clearly established,208 a standard of liability should be framed using some 
Title VII defmitions and substantive standards, but tailored for child plain-
tiffs. F or example, the unwelcomeness standard for employment-related 
sexual harassment is not well suited for application to children. A child 
plaintiff should only have to prove that sexual advances were made, not that 
the hislher conduct made it clear that they were unwelcome. There should 
be a presumption against the appropriateness of sexual conduct between 
students in school because sex in school interferes with the academic envi-
ronment, and minors are traditionally viewed as unable to give consent for 
sexual activity.209 Making a student prove unwelcomeness assumes that the 
conduct is welcome and acceptable unless he/she objects. Furthermore, es-
tablished methods of proving unwe1comeness should not apply to children; 
their conduct and dress should not amount to consent. It is inappropriate to 
treat children as sex objects, and it can be a humiliating and degrading ex-
perience for the victim to have hislher speech and dress closely scrutinized. 
When a child is sexually harassed in school, the extreme emotional and 
physical damage interferes with hislher education, thereby creating a hostile 
environment. The hostile environment theory is fitting for an academic set-
ting where a nondiscriminatory environment is essential to intellectual 
growth. 21 0 Hostile environment harassment turns on reasonableness, and 
subjecting a young student to forced sexual advances in the school setting 
should be presumed unreasonable.211 The degree of harassment should be a 
factor in determining the amount of relief available, not an element of the 
violation.212 Franklin,213 Petaluma,214 and subsequent cases require proof of 
intentional discrimination in order to bring a hostile environment action un-
der Title IX. However, prior cases have held that a plaintiff may make out a 
violation of Title IX without proving defendant had a specific intent to dis-
criminate.215 A school or faculty member that knew or should have known 
208. Bosley v. Kearney R-l Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1025 (W.D. Mo. 1995); see 
Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No.3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Given the 
extremely harmful effects sexual harassment can have on young female students, public 
officials have an especially compelling duty not to tolerate it in the classrooms and hall-
ways of our schools."). 
209. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
210. See Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. 
REv. 525, 551 (1987). Quid pro quo harassment does not apply to peer harassment be-
cause there is no supervisor/subordinate relationship on which to condition a tangible 
benefit. 
211. See Kenneth L. Pollack, Current Issues in Sexual Harassment Law, 48 V AND. L. 
REv. 1009, 1012 (1995) (describing hostile environment as based on reasonableness, and 
as a more pliable standard than quid pro quo). 
212. See Estrich, supra note 38, at 858. 
213. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). 
214. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560,1576 (N.D. Cal 1993). 
215. See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1993) 
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of the sexual harassment and did not act has discriminated against the victim 
on the basis of sex. The Petaluma court's statement that this failure could 
only be circumstantial evidence of intent to discriminate has been criticized 
by a school attorney who wrote: "It is difficult to imagine when a school 
district ... receiving the number and frequency of complaints as did the 
Petaluma School District, would not be charged with intentional discrimina-
tion for failure to act on those complaints."Z16 Based on this reasoning, as 
well as the identity of the claimant, making such discrimination per se inten-
tional when proved by a child is an appropriate legal protection. A per se 
rule goes one step further than Bosley which held that a federally funded 
district's failure to act despite knowledge of sexual harassment could lead 
the factfmder to infer that the defendant intentionally discriminated based on 
sex.217 
Peer sexual harassment in schools is a very serious and widespread 
problem. It is not acceptable for districts and faculty to look the other way 
and ignore a student's plea for help. The results are too grave. The first 
steps are prevention and school awareness. However, if school personnel 
are aware of harassing behavior but do not take action to help the victim, 
they must be held liable. The cause of action already exists under Title IX, 
but the analysis must be formulated to apply specifically to children as 
plaintiff-victims. Although a legal solution will not entirely correct the so-
cial problem of sexual harassment, a better legal solution is a viable im-
provement. It is of suprerne importance to reach the goal of Title IX, which 
is prevention of discrimination in education. 
(holding no need to require proof of discriminatory intent based on Title VI, Title VD, and 
regulations for Title IX). But see Oona R.-S. by Kate S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. 
Supp. 1452, 1464 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (distinguishing sexual harassment suits under Title 
IX from disproportionate funding suits under Title IX when requiring proof of discrimina-
tory intent). 
216. Adam A. Milani, Harassing Speech in the Public Schools: The Validity of Schools' 
Regulation of Fighting Words and the Consequences if They Do Not, 28 AKRON L. REv. 
187, 234 (1995) (quoting Ronald 1. Knox, Liability of School Employers for Sexual Har-
assment, 36 FOR THE DEFENSE 13, 16 (Mar. 1994)). 
217. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1025. 
